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 Abstract 
What contribution can visual art practice bring to interdisciplinary research? And how to 
give an account of practice-led research that acknowledges the need for interdisciplinary 
intelligibility? I consider these two questions by reflecting on the methodology--which I 
call “critical practical analogy” (CPA)--that I have developed while investigating the 
metaethical implications of French philosopher Simone Weil’s notion of attention, during 
my practice-led PhD. In order to address the first question, I consider as a case study a 
research art project that employs CPA, and I explain how CPA proved instrumental in 
overcoming the impasse that I reached by purely theoretical investigation of Weil’s 
discourse on attention and how it opened a distinctly artistic way forward in my research. 
In order to address the second question, I consider a problem posed by the 
interdisciplinary nature of my research (covering art and philosophy). I show how, 
through the application of CPA to the case study, I articulated an exegesis of my research 
that was intelligible across these two heterogeneous fields of investigation. In conclusion, 
I give some reasons for my hope that CPA may possess some heuristic and exegetical 
applicability in practice-led interdisciplinary research beyond my own research.  
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1. Interdisciplinary Incomprehension 
As early as 1973, Lucy Lippard raised the issue of communication in interdisciplinary art, 
framing it as a problem of artists not being taken seriously by the practitioners of other 
disciplines due to artists’ lack of requisite knowledge:  
Conceptual art has not . . . as yet broken down the real barriers between the 
art context and those external disciplines--social, scientific, and academic--
from which it draws sustenance. As yet the “behavioural artists” have not 
held particularly rewarding dialogues with their psychologist counterparts . . 
. “Art use” of elementary knowledge, already accepted and exhausted, and 
unsophistication in regard to work accomplished in other fields are obvious 
barriers to such interdisciplinary communication. (Lippard, 1992, pp. 895-
896) 
More recently, Victor Burgin reported a similar case of rejection of visual art research by 
academia, when Jacques Derrida refused the course work of two students who had 
submitted videos rather than papers. Derrida demanded “as much demonstrative power, 
theoretical power . . . as there would be in a good paper”; the videos, he argued, should 
have been accompanied by “a discourse refined according to the norms that matter to me” 
(Jacques Derrida, cited in Burgin, 2009, pp.77-78). 
However, during my practice-led PhD on the metaethical implications of French 
philosopher Simone Weil’s notion of attention, I found that the incomprehension ran in 
both directions: it was as arduous for philosophy-informed audiences to understand how 
the practical dimension of my research had a heuristic function as for art-informed 
audiences to grasp the metaethical significance of my research art projects. Here it will be 
helpful to elucidate the meaning of metaethics and research art project. As Alexander 
Miller explains, metaethics is a second-order inquiry about first order questions regarding 
moral obligations, the latter belonging to normative ethics (Miller, 2003, p. 1). For 
instance, normative ethics may ask whether a particular action is good or bad, while 
metaethics may ask on what basis we can define actions as being good or bad.  Research 
art projects are artworks that I developed with a view to addressing specific PhD research 
questions.  
I approached the problem of interdisciplinary incomprehension in my research as a 
question of adequate discursive representation of research art practice, by devising a 
methodology that functioned as an interface between the two fields. By research art 
practice I mean the ensemble of my research art projects. I designate this methodology 
“critical practical analogy” (CPA): an analogy that includes artistic operations for the 
purpose of critical investigation and that subsumes both theoretical and practical 
inquiries. As I will show, CPA also proved instrumental in overcoming an impasse that I 
reached by purely theoretical study of Weil’s discourse on attention.  
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2. Weilian Attention: Impasse 
Below I summarise Weil’s discourse on attention, in order to introduce the context that 
engendered critical practical analogy (CPA) and the problem it addressed. This 
introduction is also required by the fact that the case study I consider in Section 4 grew 
out of some rather specific observations about Weil’s philosophy.  
Weil articulates a hierarchy of attentive states, at whose summit is a disposition of 
absolute consent to whatever happens, a contemplative disposition towards what Weil 
calls inevitable, irremediable, and irreducible contradictions (Weil, 1997, pp. 93-94, 
2006, p. 166). The lowest level is “spontaneous” attention, which is uncontrolled: one is 
prey to emotions, immobilised and rigid (Weil, 1959, pp. 264-265). The intermediate 
level is “voluntary” attention, which is controlled: it gives rise to reality seen as a web of 
necessary connections and is thus the basis of all clear ideas and methodical action (Weil, 
1988, pp. 122-129). But the reality to which voluntary attention gives rise is only a half-
reality, compared to the full, transcendental reality disclosed by the “highest” form of 
attention (Weil, 2005, p. 188). The most elevated attention contemplates this 
transcendental reality and the irreducible contradiction that it reveals between all-
encompassing necessity and freedom.  
Naturally, this is an extremely abridged account of Weil’s multifaceted notion of 
attention. Weil wrote on attention throughout her life, and a fuller exposition of her ideas 
on this topic is beyond the scope of this article. As I pointed out, the purpose of my 
outline is primarily to contextualise the case study that I introduce later. However, in 
order to counterbalance the compressed character of my account, there follow some 
excerpts from Weil’s writings that are representative of her position.  
God produces himself perfectly . . . First of all, God loves himself . . . The 
love between God and God, which is itself God, is this doubly virtuous 
bond; this bond that unites two beings to such an extent that they are 
indiscernible and are really a single one, this bond which extends over the 
distance and overcomes an infinite separation. (Weil, 2008, p. 353) 
 
We all know that there is no good here below . . . Every human being has 
probably had during their life several moments in which they have clearly 
admitted to themselves that there is no good here below . . . It is up to them 
to remain motionless, without diverting their gaze . . . If God, after a long 
wait, gives a vague premonition of his light or even reveals himself in 
person, it is just for an instant. Once again one must remain motionless, 
attentive, and wait. (Weil, 2008, pp. 334-335) 
 
All true good entails contradictory conditions and is therefore impossible. 
He who keeps his attention truly fixed on this impossibility and acts will do 
what is good. (Weil, 2002, p. 95) 
 
Note. All translations from French texts are by the author. 
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In these passages, Weil describes God by a tautology; that is, her definition of God is 
circular: God is God. As regards Weil’s ethics (which she articulates by reflecting on the 
notion of good) she holds that the good is contradictorily both possible and impossible. 
Moreover, we can see that the contradiction that Weil sees as irreducible in ethics follows 
from the tautologousness and absolute goodness that she ascribes to God, because the 
goodness of God (as the truth of the sentence “God is God”) is not contingent, while the 
goodness of human actions is always contingent. For instance, it might seem non-
contingently good to save ten people from dying in an accident, but what if one of those 
who has been saved turns out to be a mass-murderer who will kill thousands? I do not 
need to answer this question: this kind of thought experiment is commonplace in 
discourse on ethics. My point is to illustrate why it is quite natural to think of earthly 
goodness as necessarily contingent. The crux of Weil’s view can be summarised thus: 
human best is not, and will never be, the absolute best; and we must contemplate 
attentively this truth. (Note that, in the second excerpt I quoted, the relation between the 
impossibility of good and attention is stronger that the English translation suggests, 
because, throughout her writings, Weil stresses the etymological affinity between 
attention, likewise attention in French, and waiting, attendre in French, often using the 
two terms as near synonyms.) 
Typically, Weilian scholarship endorses her views on God, the good and attention (e.g., 
Pirruccello, 1995; Springsted, 1996). That is to say, most Weil scholars hold that: 
(1) God is absolutely good and attention is a means to become a good agent.  
(2) Since the good is transcendentally revealed, there is no problem in claiming that the 
good is impossible while at the same time asserting the possibility of good, revealed to 
those who contemplate attentively the contradiction. 
On the other hand, I remained sceptical of these positions, because: 
(3) The God Weil describes--and with it the claim that God is good--meant little to me. 
As a consequence, I speculated that attention may be a mere hypothetical postulate to 
which Weil has recourse in order to account for the existence of evil within her mistaken 
metaphysics (i.e., mistaken for someone who, like me, does not believe that God is good). 
(4) Since I do not believe in revelation, I found it problematic to say that the good is both 
possible and impossible. 
I experienced my conclusions (3) and (4) as an impasse, in the sense that they precluded 
the possibility of fruitful dialogue between myself and those who hold the opposing 
views expressed in (1) and (2). I also felt that my scepticism had made me lose sight of 
my reasons for undertaking a practice-led PhD on Weil’s attention. My dissatisfaction 
with these conclusions, and with the above-mentioned interdisciplinary incomprehension, 
led to the development of CPA, by which I hoped to address Weil’s notion of attention 
through distinctly artistic means. 
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The last sentence stands in need of qualification. Before reaching this impasse, my 
research had consisted primarily of observational drawing, which I tried to legitimise 
theoretically with reference to Weil’s notion of attention. Now, I saw that the research 
might benefit from my using art practice to reflect on the notion of attention. It is also 
important to forestall a possible misunderstanding with regard to my intentions. CPA was 
not antagonistically pitched against theoretical Weilian scholarship. First, I have made it 
clear that the dissatisfaction was with my scepticism, not with positions (1) and (2). 
Second, even disregarding my necessarily limited philosophical knowledge (my 
background is in art), it would simply be preposterous on my part to believe that I could 
solve, or brush away as spurious, ethical problems with which philosophers have wrestled 
for centuries and continue to do so. And, third, throughout my PhD, I demonstrated by 
commitment to dialogue with the Weilian community, by presenting at the annual 
conferences organised by the French and the American Weil Societies. I have also 
published on Weil in journals--including the Cahiers Simone Weil, the philosophical 
journal devoted to Weil--both theoretical articles and articles dealing with CPA art 
projects (Alfier, 2009, 2010). That one such article was positively quoted by a Weilian 
scholar in a later issue of the Cahiers (Boitier, 2010, p. 109) suggests that my artistic 
approach to Weil’s philosophy has (rightly) not been interpreted by Weilian scholarship 
as a disavowal of their discourse. 
3. Critical Practical Analogy 
I devised critical practical analogy (CPA) in order to overcome the impasse and the 
interdisciplinary incomprehension to which I referred above. I achieved this aim by 
capitalising on the concrete sensible nature of artworks and by abstracting from the 
content of Weil’s metaphysical discourse: I retained only the general idea of the two 
argument forms to which, as I have indicated, this discourse appeals, namely, tautology 
and contradiction. 
I qualify CPA as “practical” to indicate that such an analogy is to be used in practice, to 
be used to act, to make something. I use “critical” with its philosophical meaning, that is, 
as reflective or investigative (Kempt Smith, 2003, p. 1; Mautner, 2000, p. 117). The 
notion of critical practical analogy derives, albeit not explicitly, from two essays by the 
art historian Charles Harrison, who, writing on an Art & Language project (the project 
involved covering figurative images by flicking white paint on them, and I will refer to it 
as “the snow project”), describes the project as a “practical analogy,” (Harrison, 2008, p. 
74) and as a “device [through which] a critical account of modernity may be realised or 
embodied or enacted” (Harrison, 2001, p. 180). For the unfamiliar reader, Art & 
Language is the name of a group of conceptual artists who choose to work collectively; 
their journal Art-Language was first published in 1969. Although Harrison does not use 
the expression “critical practical analogy,” a definition of CPA can be extrapolated by 
compounding his descriptions: a critical practical analogy is a practical analogy used as a 
critical device. 
At its most general, CPA comprises five elements: (a) an aim and (b) an outcome. As 
with any analogy, it is a relation of two analogues, which in CPA, fulfil different 
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functions: (c) the objective analogue represents a state of affairs that is assumed to be the 
case, (d) the reflective analogue is whatever that, for the purpose of the critique (i.e., of 
reflection), is assumed to be analogous in some respect to the objective analogue, and 
lastly, in order for the analogy to be practical, there needs to be (e) an operational 
principle, without which the analogy would remain merely the stating of a relation and 
not a means for action. The artist Sol LeWitt writes that, in his work, “The idea becomes 
a machine that makes art” and that “all the planning and the decisions are made 
beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair” (LeWitt, 1967, p. 79). CPA is also a 
conceptual machine, but the execution is not perfunctory: the execution leads from the 
aim to the outcome. If the outcome could be obtained simply by formulating an aim, there 
would be no justification for undertaking research. 
The snow project, by Art & Language, can be interpreted as an instance of CPA by 
drawing on Harrison’s account of it. (References to CPA are mine, not Harrison’s.) 
Harrison (2008) writes that the idea for the snow project was suggested by Lucas van 
Valckenborch’s painting Winter Landscape, 1586. In this painting--a typical Flemish 
winter scene--the representation of a snow blizzard has been achieved by seemingly 
flicking white paint on the canvas. The aim of the snow project, Harrison says, was to test 
how far Art & Language could go with modernist reductionism. Its objective analogue 
was “late-modernism’s apparent vacillation between surfeit and erasure,” exemplified by 
“the implosion of modernist reductionism with the advent of the black canvas”; this is the 
state of affairs of late-modernism that Art & Language assumes. The reflective analogue 
was the “idea of a composition painted to be snowed on” until “all vestiges of content had 
been obliterated”; this, according to Harrison, is analogous to late-modernism’s 
vacillation between surfeit and erasure. The operational principle was the carrying to its 
extreme of the technique that van Valckenborch had employed to create the effect of 
snow in Winter Landscape, that is, by “gradually snowing on figurative compositions 
with dabs of white paint.” The outcome was the marking of “a kind of limit beyond 
which art cannot really be pressed if it is to remain in any sense a social practice” 
(Harrison, 2008, p. 74). 
Before moving on to the analysis of the case study, it is important to point out that I used 
CPA in several research art projects. These projects shared the same aim and, 
collectively, obtained the same outcome. As regards objective and reflective analogues 
and operational principle, these were, at a very general level, shared by the projects, and I 
introduce them in the remainder of this paragraph. But the case study had also more 
specific analogues and operational principle, which I will detail when I consider the case 
study. The CPA that I developed aimed at finding a way out of the sceptical impasse I 
reached through my theoretical investigation of Weil’s discourse on ethics and attention. 
The objective analogue was Weil’s reliance on the notions of tautology and contradiction, 
which I described earlier. The reflective analogue was arrived at by abstracting from the 
particular instances of tautologies and contradictions to which Weil refers and by 
considering them as immaterial argument forms. The operational principle was the 
production of images of tautology and contradiction, that is, the representation of these 
argument forms through their objectification and narrativisation. The outcome was the 
development of a series of art projects in which the absoluteness of Weil’s discourse on 
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attention is not refuted but rather indirectly questioned by introducing the snag of 
contingency in tautology and contradiction, which was a result of the process of 
objectification. But, once again, I stress that these projects were not pursued in an 
antagonistic spirit against theoretical investigation of Weil’s philosophy. On the contrary, 
as the case study will show, I drew on Weilian scholarship and I reflected on what 
contribution the project could bring to this field. 
4. Case Study: Is Capable of Not Not-Being 
I now turn to my case study, Is Capable of Not Not-Being (ICONNB). This was an event, 
including an installation and a performance that took place at the Centre for Drawing, 
University of the Arts London, in December 2008. The general objective analogue of 
ICONNB was Weil’s use of tautological or circular arguments in her discourse on 
attention. (The fact that I associate tautology with circularity indicates that I do not use 
“tautology” in a technical logical sense.) The specific objective analogue was two-fold. 
First, I considered the following circular argument by which Weil defines voluntary 
attention: “In voluntary attention, one continuously . . . stops voluntary attention from 
becoming spontaneous attention” (Weil, 1959, pp. 264-265). It is clear that this definition 
is circular: What is voluntary attention? It is non-spontaneous attention. What is 
spontaneous attention? It is non-voluntary attention. 
Second, as Weilian scholar Vance Morgan (2005, p. 120) points out, Weil constructs an 
analogy between the Greek solution to the problem of incommensurables through the use 
of the circle, which transcends the numerical order, and the problem of the 
incommensurability of contingent earthly good and absolute divine good, which she 
solves by appealing to the notion of transcendence. I cannot here expand on this outline 
of Weil’s argument, which she articulates at length and with subtlety. What is crucial for 
ICONNB is the role attention plays in the argument: by the attentive contemplation of 
irreducible incommensurability, one does not obliterate incommensurability, but one can 
reach a higher level of understanding, which is geometrically represented by the circle. 
The reflective analogue was the material representation of circularity. As I have argued 
earlier, Weil maintains that without voluntary attention there would be no thinkable 
reality. Weil calls this state “the kingdom of Proteus,” because in such a state everything 
would be protean discontinuity ungraspable by thought (Weil, 1988, pp. 122-129). 
Voluntary attention, in a sense, creates reality as a semiotic tissue. Taking my cue from 
Weil’s reference to semiotics, I decided to use the notion of concrete sensible sign. 
Concrete sensible signs remain always somewhat recalcitrant to complete and univocal 
interpretation (Nöth, 1990, pp. 87-89). Most of the time, we use signs with a low degree 
of sensible concreteness, such as words or numbers; these are signs that we manage more 
or less seamlessly. The reflective analogue in ICONNB consisted of concrete sensible 
signs of circularity with a view to emphasising its aesthetic dimension. This strategy is 
not original: it has been used by several conceptual artists who, as the art historian 
Thomas McEvilley (2005) argues, have treated arguments and theories as objects with 
aesthetic presence. A typical example of this practice explicitly referencing tautology is 
William Anastasi’s Microphone 1963 (a tape recorder that plays its own sound), or his 
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Six Sites 1967 (an exhibition of photographs of the walls on which the photographs were 
hung), or, again, Bernar Venet’s Tube no. 150/30/1300 1966 (a metal tube exhibited 
alongside a diagrammatic representation of itself) (McEvilley, 2005, pp. 78-79, pp. 105-
135). Many more examples could have been given; tautology is almost an established 
genre in conceptual art, a genre intelligible to art-informed audiences. What is specific 
about ICONNB is that tautology was referenced in order to address Weil’s discourse on 
attention and ethics. 
The representation of circularity was achieved through the installation, whose operational 
principle was literally to materialise the abstract notion of circle. This principle may seem 
vague, but I cannot pretend that my artistic thought was, or typically is, more precise and 
systematic than this: there comes a point when thinking operates through making, when 
methodological explanation gives way to description of artefacts, which follows. The 
installation consisted of 400 pages containing the first million digits of π attached to the 
wall (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Is capable of not not-being installation, Centre for Drawing, London, 2008: 
First million digits of π. 
A Post-it note reading “an infinitely small portion of the digits of π,” and, on the opposite 
wall, a drawn circle with one of its diameters (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Is capable of not not-being installation, Centre for Drawing, London, 2008: 
Circle drawn on the wall. 
On the floor, red lines drawn with a permanent marker indicated the halfway point of the 
length of the room, the half of the half, and so on, until the space became too small to be 
drawn. A Post-it note placed near the main half-indicating line read "Move on, Zeno" 
(Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Is capable of not not-being installation, Centre for Drawing, London, 2008: Red 
line drawn with a permanent marker and Post-it reading “Move on, Zeno.” 
Published by AU Press, Canada   Journal of Research Practice 
 
Page 10 of 16 
The operational principle was further developed by the performance, which was in the 
form of a lecture (Figure 4). As the performance lasted over an hour, I can only sketch 
out its main focus with some examples. Perhaps, I thought, the circularity of Weil’s 
definitions of voluntary and spontaneous attention depends on the fact that one can 
understand these states only through first-hand experience. Therefore, I tried to show the 
difference between the verbal description of an occurrence and the experience of that 
occurrence: for instance, the difference between a description of silence and experiencing 
silence: I invited the audience to observe a minute of silence; or the difference between 
Weil’s description of spontaneous attention and the experience of it: I banged the table 
loudly and unexpectedly. In order to ask whether voluntary attention is possible, I invited 
the audience to try to solve the liar paradox (“this statement is false”), pointing out that 
nobody and nothing had compelled them to judge the statement alternatively true and 
false, that they had done so, assuming they had, voluntarily. This was also a further 
intimation of circularity. 
 
Figure 4. Is capable of not not-being performance, Centre for Drawing, London, 2008. 
As for the materialisation of the recalcitrant aspect of signs, the almost materially 
negligible sign “π” becomes slightly more materially substantial in the drawn circle and 
diameter, and becomes much more substantial in the 400 sheets of the first million digits 
of π: the wall was not large enough to accommodate them all, so a pile of them was left 
on the ground; and the ink ran out while printing them (another indication of their 
materiality) (Figure 5). Furthermore, the Post-it note reading “an infinitely small portion 
of the digits of π” reminded the audience that, no matter how many digits of π one prints 
out, it will always be an infinitesimal portion of the digits of π: all the paper and ink in 
the world could not make the statement “This is an infinitely small portion of the digits of 
π” false. In this respect, this statement shares with tautologies the property of always 
being true. 
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Figure 5. Is capable of not not-being, 2008: A4 print-out of the first million digits of π, 
where the ink is running out. 
The lines on the floor materialised Zeno’s argument on the infinite divisibility of space, 
which leads to his famously controversial negation of the possibility of spatial movement. 
Even in this case, the materialisation brings recalcitrance, and once again there is a gap 
between conceptual description and actual occurrence: at some point, no more lines can 
actually be drawn. 
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5. Outcome of Is Capable of Not Not-Being 
The application of critical practical analogy (CPA) in Is Capable of Not Not-Being 
(ICONNB) led to the two outcomes that I describe below. Insofar as, as I will show, 
ICONNB contributed to the field of Weilian studies through distinctly artistic means, 
these outcomes fulfil my aim: that is, overcoming the sceptical impasse that I reached 
through my theoretical investigation. In what follows, I outline the nature of this 
contribution as an example of the kind of contribution art practice can bring to 
interdisciplinary research and I offer some reflections on the issue of interdisciplinary 
intelligibility. However, it should be realised that, as ICONNB is only one of several PhD 
art projects, this is not an exhaustive account of CPA’s import in my research.  
At first sight, the following outcome may appear to have merely personal value. To be 
able to use my practice to engage with Weil’s philosophy--rather than appealing to the 
latter to legitimise the former--is a definite improvement for my practice, as I would be 
very dissatisfied if my work were accessible only to Weil scholars or burdened with a too 
heavy textual explanation (the ICONNB lecture was not an explanation of the project). 
However, I believe that, in this respect, my CPA methodological approach could be of 
interest to other artist-researchers, since, from my experience as an artist-researcher, I 
gather that many artists engaged in theory-heavy research are troubled by the (very real) 
prospect of art practice becoming a mere mouthpiece for theory, rather than a critical 
instrument. 
As I explained in Section 3, CPA can be used by artists engaged in research to identify 
assumed states of affairs, with a view to critiquing those assumptions through analogies 
mediated by art projects. The objective analogue could be used to represent any assumed 
state of affairs. In the same way that I abstracted from the specific concerns that Art & 
Language had in the snow project and identified the general schema of critical practical 
analogy that underlines the project, so the particular set of aim, outcome, objective and 
reflective analogues, and operational principle that I have devised for my CPA is by no 
means prescriptive. But although the potential application of CPA in interdisciplinary 
research is in principle as broad as the ingenuity of the artists who may use it, in practice, 
I expect that the analogical method would be particularly suited to, and perhaps only 
applicable in, the less technical branches of philosophy. I do not suppose that CPA could 
be employed very effectively, for instance, in formal logic or, even less so, the hard 
sciences, because the rather open-ended, albeit methodologically guided, use of analogy 
which is constitutive of CPA is, in my view, incompatible with the more stringent 
research procedures adopted in these fields.  
It may seem that, by treating tautology as an aesthetic object, I was able to generate new 
artwork, but I did not really overcome the impasse: I merely bypassed it (ignored it), 
while Weilian scholars will continue their discussions regardless. But I would argue that 
a project like ICONNB could have a beneficial effect on philosophical discussion, acting 
as a concrete antidote to highly abstract speculation. This argument, I admit, is only 
moderately persuasive, and some may judge the benefit as modest. Stronger support for 
my claim that, through CPA, I did more than merely turning my back on the impasse is 
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given, first, by the aforementioned fact that my research artwork has been referred to 
(and, in my view, pertinently) in the Cahiers Simone Weil; and, second, by the positive 
contribution to the field, which is the second outcome of ICONNB, and to which I now 
turn.  
ICONNB highlighted the fact that Weil’s discourse on ethical attention can sometimes be 
circular and, more importantly, that she saw the notion of circularity as a means of 
reaching that higher level of attention which is so central to her ethics. As these 
observations are new to Weil scholarship, they constitute a contribution to this field and 
indicate the heuristic function of CPA. But this contribution becomes intelligible to the 
Weilian community in virtue of the discursive representation of art practice through 
CPA--of which most of this article is an example--which chronicles how ICONNB 
evolved out of the objective analogue, that is, out of Weil’s philosophical writings (of 
course, mediated by my interpretations and by those found in secondary literature). On 
the other hand, art-informed audiences could find an interpretative access via the 
reflective analogue and operational principle, which, as I pointed out in Section 4, 
reference an established artistic strategy of conceptual artists: namely, the translation of 
theories into aesthetic objects. Presenting my work in exhibitions, seminars, and 
conferences, I have found that indeed the reflective analogue and operational principle 
afforded this access. 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, I must stress that there is a price to pay for intelligibility in 
interdisciplinary practice-led research: explanation seems to run counter to the semantic 
richness of artworks. In my view, the kind of discursive explanation of art practice 
afforded by critical practical analogy (CPA) goes some way in addressing this problem, 
by stressing the heuristic function of research art projects rather than their meaning 
(notwithstanding the fact that function and meaning are seldom clearly distinguishable), 
by focussing on the process by which art projects emerge and develop rather than on the 
final product, and also by overtly acknowledging its limited scope: that of articulating 
and of making explicit a relation between two very specific theoretical and artistic 
practices of inquiry. But, ultimately, it is up to artists engaged in interdisciplinary 
research to remain open to the interpretations of others, especially those at odds with 
theirs. This is perhaps true for every artist, but it is undeniable that the prolonged, narrow 
focus required by PhD research turns the possibility of highly biased and skewed 
interpretations of one’s own artwork into an occupational hazard. Breaking down the task 
of reflecting on my art practice into the components of CPA made it easier for me to see 
when my interpretations were too farfetched. I therefore hope that other artist-researchers 
may find CPA useful in this respect. 
Whether CPA could be useful for practice-led interdisciplinary research beyond my own 
can only be assessed empirically by artists actually using it. Naturally, as my PhD 
focussed on the metaethical implications of Weil’s notion of attention, this kind of 
empirical assessment was not part of my investigation. However, since usefulness 
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necessarily depends on usability, I can at least adduce two reasons that sustain my 
confidence in a more general applicability of CPA. 
First, through the analysis of the case study that I articulated in this article, I hope to have 
shown that CPA is a viable alternative model (a model which could also be used 
complementarily in conjunction with other models) for practice-led interdisciplinary 
research. In order to reiterate this point, I will outline a conjectured research into Weil’s 
notion of attention, still involving art practice, but which, in my view, would be 
artistically less coherent and interesting. Such research could, for instance, comprise the 
following steps: (1) an exclusively theoretical study of Weil’s writings and other relevant 
philosophical discourses, (2) a positioning of Weilian attention within the map of 
contemporary ethical viewpoints, and (3) a discursive representation of my pre-existing 
art practice with reference to the results of (1) and contextualised with regard to (2). In 
this scenario, art practice would have only an exegetic function. On the other hand, in 
ICONNB and my other PhD art projects, the very fact of establishing critical practical 
analogies had a strong, and surprising, bearing on the course my practice would take: in 
Section 2, I described how, as a consequence of CPA, my practice moved away from my 
initial concern with observational drawing and towards a more conceptual approach. I 
believe the potential that CPA has for opening up art practice towards new and 
unexpected directions would appeal to researchers in many different fields. 
Second, CPA does not necessarily have to precede practice-led research and drive 
inquiry, but could also follow the production of research artwork and be used as an 
instrument for reflection and explanation. This makes CPA particularly suited to practice-
led research, because, although practice-led researchers know where their research is 
heading, it is also true that surprises and subsequent changes of course are of a different 
order and far more widespread in practice-led research than in other fields of 
investigation. I suggest that artists could, initially, concentrate separately on the 
theoretical and practical aspects of their research, proceeding in a rather intuitive fashion 
as far as art practice is concerned. When a body of work has been created, the task of 
articulating an appropriate CPA could help artists to identify more precisely those 
theoretical strands that, in light of the artwork produced, appear now particularly relevant 
to the research. This would not be a mere “rebranding” of the artwork in question, but 
would help artists to become progressively clearer with regard to their research questions 
and aims. 
In view of these considerations, I hope that CPA could provide artists and other inquirers 
engaged in interdisciplinary practice-led research with a heuristic research tool and a 
template for articulating a discursive representation of art practice that both 
acknowledges the non-linearity and indirectness of practice-led research and the need for 
interdisciplinary intelligibility. 
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